




Reliability of Solid Rocket Motor Cases and Nozzles
by J.G. Crose
A recent article in Aerospace America* claims that "the average success ratio of the
current U.S. stable of launch vehicles, including upper stages, is about 92% (without upper
stages it is close to 95%). The 8% failure probability implies an expected loss of $12M per
flight, not including the lost opportunity costs." Since payload costs are likely to be much
greater than launch costs and even more so for the new launch vehicles for the Advanced
Launch Development Program (ALDP), the cost of rocket motor unreliability at the current 8%
rate can run into billions of dollars if expected increases in demand are realized.
At an 8% failure rate, it is extremely unlikely that failure will occur during the first few
ground tests of a new system. At that time, most of the design, analysis and tooling costs of
the program have been expended. Since most systems are expected to be used ten to a hundred
or more times, the likelihood of one or more failures is very large, and it can be expected that
the above losses will be realized in the future. This will occur unless the problems are
addressed and remedied. Recent trends suggest the problem is not being addressed adequately.
The obvious causes of failure are poor design, lack of quality control of raw materials
entering the manufacturing process, lack of quality control during the manufacturing process
and inadequate NDE or proof testing. The root causes of failure relate to an inadequate
understanding of the influence of design variables on performance and reliability, an inadequate
understanding of raw material and process parameter variations on performance and reliability
and the inability to find and recognize defects in manufactured parts. It is believed that solid
rocket motor reliability can only be improved by addressing the above issues in a highly
disciplined scientific approach. The build and test system presently used cannot assure
reliability beyond the present levels.
The predictability of material behavior lies at the base of reliability improvement and
feeds into the above issues relating to design variables, raw material and process variations and
defect identification. The keys to predicting material behavior are the performance of tests
which enable one to measure the response to a variety of environmental conditions, the
development of verified behavioral theories, and the implementation of measured data and
verified numerical algorithms into verified performance predictions. Because of the geometric
and environmental complexity of rocket motor systems, these procedures require computer
automation.
The above translates into a need for effective computer programs for design/analysis, a
comprehensive materials data base, process environment modeling, defect identification and
improved materials. Mathematical algorithms are needed to simulate physical behavior and
* Tragola" J.R. "A Second Look at Launch System Reliability. Aerospace America, November 1991. pp. 36-39.
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predictbehaviorwith confidence beyond the envelope of the data base. Additional testing of
material response to produce data in appropriate environments and during processing needs to
be performed and the data organized into easily accessible computerized materials data bases.
Scientific labor must be expended to develop appropriate material response tests, interpret test
data, innovate physically based models of behavior and implement this knowledge into
computer aided engineering tools for use by the solid propulsion industry. Appropriate
industry representation needs to be a part of the process through seminars, publications, shared
data bases and round robin verification of design/analysis techniques. Acceptance tests must
be upgraded to monitor relevant responses to SR.M performance.
The current Solid Propulsion Integrity Program (SPIP) at Marshall Space Flight Center
should be considered a model for future efforts to improve solid rocket motor (SRM)
reliability. However, the current funding levels are not sufficient to accomplish much more
than a small subset of the overall need. A key issue confronting the community is the need for
a change in the "culture". Interviews with designers of SRM's have convinced this author that
they are very apprehensive of the first firing of a new design, even if it involves a small
change. This means that the design is heavily based on experience and not on the level of
technology that goes into many other products that exhibit more reliability such as jet engines
on commercial aircraft. This results in SRM's with lower response and reliability than could
be achieved with a physically based model of material response.
The solid rocket motor community has tried throughout the years to adapt technology
developed elsewhere to their needs. This has been largely due to economics. Many of these
technologies are credible in their prior use, but lack specific features that would make them
more relevant to solid rocket motors. For example, the SRM community was quick to adopt
finite element me',hods for analysis of grains and nozzles in the late 60's, but has been very
slow in further developments to reflect the unique nonlinear behavior of the materials used in
SRM's. It is no wonder that the methodology has been found to be inadequate.
Unfortunately, the community seems to have resolved the problem with mistrust of available
methods and a design philosophy that precludes substantial change from one system to the
next. The economic consequences of unreliability are severe enough to have warranted the
further development of analytical methods and material behavior studies, but the lack of
customer pressure in a highly competitive arena has in effect traded reliability for low system
development cost. Therefore, a clear need exists for a change of emphasis and NASA should
provide a leadership roll due to the enhanced sensitivity to reliability related to manned vehicles
and to heightened public awareness. The key technology requirements offering the potential to
significantly reduce overall systems cost, improve reliability and performance of solid rocket
motors are common across all subsystems:
* Understanding and control of material and process variability
* Analytically driven test methodology development and improved constitutive
models
* Establishment of improved failure criteria
* Understanding effects ofdefects
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• Design for inspectabiliry
• Environmentally driven process and technology development
• Design and optimization of materials for the environment.
This workshop identified specific technology needs directly related to known problem
areas in solid rocket motors. The issues were separated between cases, nozzles,
bondlines/propellant and insulation. Bondlines, propellants and insulation are covered in a
separate narrative elsewhere in this report. The following problem areas require funding
support to improve the reliability of U.S. solid rocket motors:
• Nozzles
• Inadequate material property data base
* Lack of knowledge of influence of process variables on performance and reliability
• Inadequate failure criteria, influence of material variability and effects of defects
• Inadequate design/analysis codes
• Inadequate nozzle design methodology
• Inadequate flex Mating design data
• Inadequate cleaning for bonding
• Lack of relationships between materials chemical constituency and material properties
• Need for low cost materials
• Need for design data on structural adhesives
• Need for better material property characterization and micro-mechanical modeling
• Constitutive modeling of nozzle materials
• Erosion modeling of nozzle materials
* Large nozzle technology requirements.
• Cases
• Inadequate understanding of case joint and attachment
• Need for definitive case design and analysis methodology
• Environmental concerns over materials used in processing
• Costs for high rate production
• Inadequate case codes
* Need for self insulating case designs
* Need lower cost/quicker turnaround case tooling.
The attached figure illustrates the interrelationships between the various functions of
design and analysis. Improvements in one area can benefit others while in other cases,
multiple improvements must be made simultaneously to realize the expected benefits. The
shaded boxes represent the end points where improvements will lead to improved performance
and reliability.
Approaches have been defined which can be implemented to achieve the goals
associated with increased reliability of solid rocket motors. The quad charts outline these
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specific programs. There are some key concerns that have driven the recommendations in the
nozzle and case areas. Lessons learned from previous ground and flight failures provide much
of the background.
In the nozzle area, design analysis is a major shortfall. More accurately measured
material properties, verified modeling procedures and comprehensive failure criteria are badly
needed to assess designs before programs are committed to them. A major deficiency is lack of
treatment of pyrolysis gas flow through the materials and bondlines of the nozzle. Resultant
pore pressures are a source of loads not accounted for in contemporary designs. This
deficiency may have been partly or totally responsible for failures of the IUS and STAR 48
motors. Also, anomalous erosion in the SRM is attributed to pocketing, ply-lift and wedgeout
failure modes involving pore pressure loadings.
In the case area, design analysis is also a major shortfall. In addition to the need for
more accurately measured material properties, verified modeling procedures and
comprehensive failure criteria, a unique need is to be able to predict the detailed geometry of a
wound case as a function of design and manufacturing variables. This includes definition of
residual stresses in the cured case and/or changes in geometry resulting from cure. Large cases
need joints. The recent Challenger disaster highlights a number of problem areas requiring
attention such as the need for highly detailed nonlinear 3D analysis of joint action and need for
material properties as a function of all environmental variables (temperature, humidity, etc.).
One of the results of a weak technology base is that engineers lose credibility when their
methods produce mixed or erroneous results. The resulting mistrust of engineering
conclusions by management can lead to disastrous decisions as was the case in the Challenger
disaster when engineers could not convince management that real dangers were present in a
cold launch of the shuttle.
The preliminary efforts conducted by SPIP and elsewhere have illustrated the potential
for design improvements which will result in both high reliability and improved performance.
The increase in asset allocation required to carry these efforts to an appropriate level are
nominal when compared to the cost of projected failures based on current design reliability.























TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
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9.4.3 Solid Propulsion Integrity Program (SPIP) for Verifiable
Enhanced Solid Rocket Motor Reliability
by Barry L. Butler
326
